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The view that central banks have an incentive to monitor the fiscal position of the government rests on 
at least two grounds. First, the government may be tempted to call on the central bank for finance 
rather than borrow in capital markets. Second, fiscal policy can have a large impact on the economy 
due to its effects on aggregate demand, and because perceptions regarding the sustainability of fiscal 
policy can affect financial markets. Problems in the implementation of fiscal policy could therefore 
interfere with the two widely accepted goals of central banks, which are to control inflation and 
contribute to macroeconomic and financial stability. They could also adversely affect the balance sheet 
or profitability of the central bank. 
The risks to central bank goals are particularly high in emerging markets, where fiscal imbalances are 
frequently associated with economic disruptions and have impaired monetary policy implementation. 
Such disruptions are rare in advanced market economies, which appear to be less vulnerable to real 
or financial shocks, and whose governments are less susceptible to financing constraints. 
The papers in this volume explore the subject of the meeting on “Fiscal issues and central banking in 
emerging economies” held at the BIS in December 2002 by focusing on three broad questions. First, 
how should central banks assess and manage the fiscal position, particularly over the medium term? 
Second, what is the experience with the use of countercyclical fiscal policy? Third, how do fiscal 
operations affect central bank balance sheets, and to what extent should such balance sheet effects 
be a concern? The contributions by central bank participants and BIS staff address these questions by 
highlighting the issues and discussing cross-country experiences and policies. Within this framework, 
the papers focus on issues that central banks consider particularly important.  
1.  Assessing and managing the fiscal position 
Measurement issues 
To choose a fiscal target, policymakers must first decide how to assess the fiscal position. This raises 
a number of problems, such as what should be included in measures of the fiscal position and how 
debt sustainability should be evaluated.  
Many central banks prefer to monitor the fiscal operations of the central government because the data 
are more readily available. However, subnational governments, public corporations or extra-budgetary 
entities also affect the fiscal position of the government. Relying on central government data may not 
always lead to problems but, in a number of very visible cases, local authorities or other government-
linked entities have incurred deficits that eventually had to be absorbed by the central government, or 
that led to money creation.  
                                                       
1  This overview in particular, and the volume in general, have greatly benefited from the cooperation, comments and 
statistical input of the central banks invited to the meeting. Thanks also go to John Hawkins for his work in editing this 
volume, to Lizzie Locke and Karina Tarling for secretarial assistance, to Arwen Hopkins, Nigel Hulbert, Tom Minić, 
Alison Spurway and colleagues in the Monetary and Economic Department of the BIS for editorial suggestions and to Liliana 
Morandini and Gabriela Salvisberg for production assistance. This paper has benefited from comments by Palle Andersen, 
John Hawkins, Dubravko Mihaljek, Madhusudan Mohanty, Bruno Tissot, Philip Turner and William White. Opinions 
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily shared by the BIS or the central banks involved. 
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Recent experience also highlights the importance of using more comprehensive public sector 
accounts, which allow an assessment of the impact of quasi-fiscal activities and of the contingent 
liabilities of the public sector on the government’s fiscal position. Government guarantees, pension 
liabilities or financial sector distress may ultimately add to the government’s fiscal burden. For 
example, China’s fiscal deficit could be as high as 5-6% of GDP (IMF estimates) if the government’s 
quasi-fiscal liabilities from the banking system were included, compared to the 2-3% official estimate.  
At the same time, it may be important to focus on net as well as gross debt to the extent possible. In 
this way, account can be taken of assets that may generate income to service debt. For example, in 
Brazil there are very liquid government assets (deposits of the social security system, tax collected by 
all government levels but not yet transferred to the treasuries, demand deposits of all levels of 
government - including treasury deposits at the central bank) that are potentially available 
immediately. These total nearly 7% of GDP, according to the paper by Goldfajn in this volume. As 
discussed further below, central banks often engage in fiscal operations that affect their balance 
sheets and remit profits to the government. Consolidating a government’s fiscal position with the 
central bank can also provide valuable information. 
A number of papers highlight the need to capture changes in government worth in a more forward-
looking (and economically more sensible) way. For instance, there is a clear willingness to move away 
from cash methods of accounting when recording government expenditure and revenue, and instead 
to use the time of accrual (ie when the claim arose rather than when it was paid). Furthermore, 
privatisation receipts should be regarded as a capital transaction rather than current revenue. And 
future liabilities arising from current policies should be considered, although this may be empirically 
difficult. Such methods can all give a more accurate impression of the government’s fiscal position. For 
example, the Czech public sector deficit for 2002 is estimated at 0.5% of GDP using a cash-based 
method, but a much higher 3.9% of GDP using a method that explicitly excludes privatisation 
revenues. Accrual methods also lead to higher estimates of the fiscal deficit in Hungary (see the 
respective contributions by Matalik and Slavik and by Kiss in this volume).  
The rationale for, and implications of, various types of consolidation, as well as experience with or 
implications of the use of non-cash methods of accounting, are highlighted in a number of the 
contributed papers included in this volume as well as in the paper by Mihaljek and Tissot. 
The sustainability of fiscal policy 
A key question confronting policymakers and purchasers of government securities in emerging 
economies is the sustainability of fiscal policy. Some theoretical models of the long run stress 
“solvency”, defined as ultimately repaying all debt. To achieve this, the present value of future fiscal 
surpluses must exceed the outstanding net public debt. In the short run, sustainability is more closely 
related to liquidity as it implies that interruptions in financing, rescheduling or default can be avoided 
without sudden adjustments in revenues or expenditures. Such an assessment is not easy; see IMF 
(2003). A low ratio of public debt to GDP is a useful indicator of the likely sustainability of a 
government’s fiscal policies. A low ratio means that the government will be able to repay its debt under 
most conceivable economic conditions, so that investors will usually require a low sovereign risk 
premium. In contrast, if debt levels exceed a certain threshold, a country may find itself constrained in 
adopting expansionary policies, as it may experience higher sovereign risk premia and volatility in its 
costs of financing. 
For example, in his contribution to this volume, Chung reports that Korea had ample scope to adopt 
expansionary fiscal policies to offset the impact of the financial crisis in 1997. The importance of a low 
level of public debt is also illustrated by the contrasting experiences of Chile and Brazil (respective 
public debt ratios of 14% and 49% in 2000) during the episode of financial turbulence observed in 
emerging economies starting around May 2002. Spreads on the debts of both economies rose 
significantly, but the increases in spreads in Chile from relatively low levels was not a major concern. 
In contrast, in Brazil, spreads rose from 780 basis points to a clearly unsustainable 2,700 basis points. 
(The sustainability of Brazil’s debt in the face of shocks of this kind is the subject of Goldfajn’s paper.) 
The threshold debt ratio above which a country becomes vulnerable to shocks that may threaten 
sustainability is not precisely identified. Marshall suggests net debt of 25-30% of GDP in his paper; 
see also IMF (2002, 2003). Much depends on the level of private saving - the higher this is, the higher 
the threshold is likely to be. It also depends on a country’s history of default and level of economic and 
institutional development; see Reinhart et al (2003). Experience suggests that this threshold is much 
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 higher in the developed countries than in emerging market economies. It also depends on economic 
and political conditions and so varies widely among emerging economies. Public debt ratios in Asian 
countries are in some cases as large as in Latin American countries, but are generally thought to be 
more sustainable, as reflected in credit ratings and sovereign spreads.  
For any given debt ratio, sustainability depends on the expected path of the public debt. Such debt 
dynamics may be described by estimating whether the primary fiscal balance is sufficiently high to 
prevent the debt ratio from rising; see Blanchard (1990). Mihaljek and Tissot’s paper applies this 
analytical framework to a set of emerging economies, identifying a number of cases in which public 
debt ratios display a tendency to rise. Underlying these debt dynamics are factors such as the ability of 
the government to raise revenues or limit expenditures, medium-term growth prospects and the share 
of public debt denominated in foreign currency. In Hong Kong there is no net public debt but large 
budget deficits are rapidly depleting (substantial) fiscal reserves, raising sustainability concerns. (See 
the paper by Peng et al in this volume.)  
As noted by Mihaljek and Tissot, debt sustainability may also be influenced by sudden increases in 
financing costs that may result from shifts in market sentiment. This is a major risk when debt is 
denominated in foreign currencies - debt/GDP ratios can jump in an alarming way when the exchange 
rate collapses. Other examples include cases with floating or short-maturity debt.
2 There are also 
many examples of countries in which contingent or previously unrecognised liabilities raise debt levels, 
often very dramatically. For example, as a result of a financial crisis, Turkey’s public debt to GDP ratio 
rose from around 30% in 1999 to nearly 70% in 2001. Accounting for liabilities associated with the 
resolution of the 1997 financial crisis increased the estimate of the public debt to GDP ratio by two 
thirds in Thailand (to 54% in 2002) and nearly doubled it in Mexico (to 40%). Accounting for contingent 
or “hidden” liabilities would raise public debt estimates by 10 percentage points in Brazil and the 
Czech Republic. (See the respective contributions of Binay, Rattakul, Sidaoui, Goldfajn, and Matalik 
and Slavik to this volume.) 
Other things equal, a country also appears to be more vulnerable to debt sustainability problems the 
larger is its external public debt (denominated in foreign currency) and the smaller its export revenues. 
In addition, the total external debt of the country may also matter, even if this debt is largely private, 
because debt servicing problems of the private sector may affect the exchange rate and the cost of 
financing of the government. Moreover, there have been cases in which the government has, for 
various reasons, assumed the debt obligations of the private sector. Due to much lower national 
saving rates and trade openness, the ratio of external debt to exports is several times higher in Latin 
American economies than in Asian countries with comparable ratios of public debt to GDP.  
The preceding discussion thus suggests that, at any given point in time, debt sustainability will depend 
on the level of debt and underlying long-run fundamentals (the rate of growth of the economy, the real 
rate of interest, primary balance) as well as market sentiment that may influence the cost (and even 
availability) of financing. For this reason, the analysis of debt sustainability is often implemented by 
examining alternative scenarios. For example, the paper by Goldfajn argues that Brazilian public debt 
is likely to be sustainable under most plausible scenarios. Stress tests reported by Sidaoui suggest 
that Mexico’s public debt will deteriorate in the medium term only in the most adverse case.  
The actual (as opposed to the projected) performance of countries in achieving medium-term fiscal 
consolidation is described in a number of country papers. For example, Vijayaledchumy describes how 
Malaysia’s public debt ratio fell from 103% of GDP in 1986 to 32% in 1997 before rising to around 44% 
in 2001. Fiscal stimulus packages implemented since the crisis of 1997-98 appear to have had no 
adverse effects on market sentiment. Marcus highlights South Africa’s success in reducing budget 
deficits from close to 8% of GDP in the early 1990s to around 2% of GDP currently. In contrast, as 
noted by Mohan and by Uribe and Lozano respectively, India and Colombia were unable to sustain 
reductions in fiscal deficits in the 1990s. As discussed by Sidaoui and Vyugin respectively, Mexico and 
Russia are in a situation where the short-run fiscal position is temporarily favourable, but steps need to 
be taken to ensure that this is sustained in the long run.  
                                                       
2  For a discussion of these effects, see Calvo et al (2002) and Goldstein and Turner (2003). 
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Transparency, communications and perceptions 
Participants at the meeting discussed the relative merits of transparency in measures of the fiscal 
position, particularly with regard to hidden liabilities. In developed countries, the case for transparency 
seems unambiguous. While it may occasionally lead to adverse shifts in market sentiment, greater 
transparency appears unlikely to destabilise developed financial markets. On the contrary, 
transparency might well increase the confidence of investors, thus enhancing market liquidity. In 
addition, transparency could lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, and, by allowing 
government debt to be priced correctly, should create incentives for policymakers to maintain a 
sustainable fiscal position.  
The benefits cited above could also exist in emerging economies. For instance, the importance of 
market discipline in shaping policy and curbing fiscal dominance (a situation in which fiscal policy 
ultimately governs price determination) is highlighted by the experience of Israel (see Sokoler’s 
contribution to this volume). Nonetheless, the disclosure of problems that had previously been hidden 
can also lead to sudden changes in the perceived sustainability of public debt and interruptions in 
liquidity. For example, Goldfajn’s analysis suggests that markets may have misinterpreted Brazil’s 
disclosure of contingent liabilities (“skeletons”) as reflecting a trend rather than a one-time increase in 
the debt ratio. The questions of how to ensure that data are interpreted correctly, and the timing of 
disclosure, warrant further examination. 
A related question concerns the best strategy for communicating fiscal policy. In his paper, Farfán 
reports that a 1999 Peruvian fiscal law “requires the publication of a three-year macroeconomic 
framework containing the fundamental principles of fiscal policy, as well as macroeconomic 
forecasts ...”. The law also spells out approval and publication arrangements intended to enhance 
understanding of fiscal policy intentions. 
Fiscal targets or rules 
Many emerging market economies have sought to limit deficits and curb the growth of public debt by 
adopting fiscal rules or targets, some supported by legislation. For example, in response to fiscal 
imbalances, in 2000 the Chilean government adopted a fiscal rule that targets a 1% central 
government structural surplus. In that same year Brazil adopted a fiscal responsibility law, which set 
an annual primary surplus target. It also set limits on expenditure and public debt, imposed rules for 
offsetting increased expenditure or tax revenue declines and controlling public finances during election 
years. In Malaysia, the government has no formal rules, but unwritten arrangements require that 
revenue exceed current expenditure and debt service payments have to be limited to 20% of such 
expenditure. The papers in this volume reveal that the approaches to such rules vary widely, raising a 
number of questions about their design.  
Ideally, a target or rule should be sufficiently restrictive to achieve a desired fiscal goal in the medium 
term, while allowing automatic stabilisers to smooth incomes over the business cycle so that policy 
has an element of countercyclicality. This suggests that it may be appropriate for a country to adopt a 
medium-term or structural target, like Chile. In practice, however, emerging economies do not always 
rely on such targets. One reason may be that, as discussed below, automatic stabilisers appear to be 
weak, which may explain why countries have implemented countercyclical fiscal policy by engaging in 
off-balance sheet spending or sharply increasing the structural deficit. As described by Peng et al in 
their paper, Hong Kong is an example of the latter.  
Another reason, relevant where debt sustainability is a concern, is that policymakers may find it 
necessary to achieve consistent reductions in budget deficits or debt ratios to reinforce credibility, 
rather than risk having markets misinterpret a cyclical increase in the budget deficit as indicating a 
permanent relaxation of fiscal policy. Under these conditions, a fiscal policy geared to medium-term 
fiscal sustainability may be procyclical. Because of the size and volatility of interest payments in some 
countries, the overall deficit may not accurately reflect fiscal policy effort, and the primary balance may 
provide a clearer signal, so targets are sometimes expressed in terms of the primary balance.  
The importance of sustainability considerations in the setting of fiscal balance targets is apparent in a 
number of the contributed papers. Farfán notes that Peru targets a declining path for overall fiscal 
deficits that is consistent with a sustainable public debt ratio (and the central bank’s inflation target). 
Sidaoui points out that Mexico’s efforts to consolidate its fiscal accounts do not give it room to engage 
in countercyclical fiscal policy; on the contrary, fiscal policy in Mexico has been procyclical. 
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 Appropriately designed fiscal rules could play a role in resolving the relationship between central and 
subnational governments in emerging markets. Subnational budget deficits have required restructuring 
or bailouts in a number of countries. In China before 1994, deficit spending by provincial or local 
authorities directly influenced money creation by The People’s Bank of China. A number of tools are 
available to curb subnational fiscal deficits. These include deficit ceilings, restrictions on borrowing 
from central banks, limits on borrowing from commercial banks, rules on the use of borrowed funds, 
limits on the annual issuance of debt, limits on the outstanding stock of debt, and the absence of 
central government guarantees.  
Effectiveness and flexibility 
Given the apparent popularity of fiscal rules, one may also ask whether they are usually effective. The 
picture is mixed. A study by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) suggests that fiscal rules are effective, 
but some of the research and examples cited by Mihaljek and Tissot indicate that they often are not. 
For example, while recently adopted fiscal rules in Brazil and Chile appear to have succeeded in 
curbing deficits, there are several examples in which countries have had difficulty in implementing 
rules. Experience with various rules in curbing subnational deficits has also been mixed. Part of the 
problem may be moral hazard: central governments are often reluctant to allow subnational 
governments to default, giving the latter little incentive to curb deficits. 
While further research is needed to identify the reasons for these mixed results, it is apparent that the 
perceived costs of implementing rules often outweigh the benefits. The incentive to adhere to a fiscal 
rule under varying economic conditions should therefore be taken into account when designing the 
rule, for example by allowing for flexibility during cyclical downturns.  
The role of incentives in the implementation of fiscal rules may also be highlighted by the experience 
of central and eastern European countries that are expected to join the euro area. Given that EMU 
accession may reduce long-term interest rates, one might expect there to be strong incentives for 
compliance with the fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. But so far fiscal consolidation has 
remained limited in central and eastern European countries. Rozkrut points out that the stringency of 
the Stability and Growth Pact will require a significant tightening of Polish fiscal policy in the near 
future, which may lead to significant costs in terms of growth.  
2. Countercyclical  fiscal  policy and central banks 
In response to the slowdown in the global economy since 2000, emerging economies have used 
various combinations of fiscal and monetary policies to dampen the external demand shock. However, 
the policy mix has varied, as countries have often resorted to easier monetary policies in response to 
sluggish growth, but have not always adopted countercyclical fiscal policies. What is the role of fiscal 
policy in stabilising business cycles in emerging economies? The contributions of central banks, and 
the paper by Mohanty and Scatigna in this volume, highlight the following points. 
First, alternative measures of fiscal policy provide a mixed picture of policy responses during the 
recent slowdown. Around half of a set of 23 emerging market economies experienced rising budget 
deficits, suggesting that policy may have been countercyclical. But it is hard to judge because 
estimates of the structural, or the cyclically adjusted, budget balances are often not available in 
emerging economies. 
Second, in contrast to advanced economies, automatic stabilisers appear to play a relatively small role 
in offsetting fluctuations in output in emerging economies. Low tax elasticities and the low share of 
taxes to GDP limit the role of revenue stabilisers. Expenditure stabilisers also tend to be small 
because of a large proportion of fixed expenditures and the general absence of (expensive) 
unemployment insurance. For this reason, many countries have resorted to discretionary fiscal policy 
to offset demand fluctuations. Measures of structural deficits tended to rise during periods of slower 
economic growth. The tactics varied, including boosting spending on employment-oriented 
programmes or projects thought to have high expenditure multipliers, switching expenditures from 
imported to domestically produced goods, the front-loading of expenditures and off-budget 
government investments tending to boost demand. 
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Third, the standard theoretical Keynesian case for using countercyclical fiscal policy in emerging 
economies subject to large shocks must be qualified by a number of factors. Small, or even negative, 
fiscal multipliers may result if confidence is damaged and interest rates rise, crowding out domestic 
investment. 
Fourth, notwithstanding the obstacles cited above, fiscal policy has played an important role in 
boosting demand in a number of emerging economies. A notable example is Asia, where fiscal 
stimulus was used by many economies in the wake of the 1997-98 financial crises. Examining 
behaviour over a longer time period, Mohanty and Scatigna find that underlying fiscal balances 
improved during “good” times (when output growth picks up sharply) and deteriorated during “bad” 
times (when output growth falls sharply), suggesting some countercyclicality, with Asia apparently able 
to respond more strongly to slowdowns than Latin America. One explanation is that Asia is much less 
subject to financing constraints than is Latin America.  
Fifth, monetary policy has also eased in a number of countries during the slowdown that began in 
2001, apparently facilitated by low inflation (in the context of large output gaps in a number of 
countries), and the easing in global monetary conditions. The analysis of Mohanty and Scatigna 
suggests that monetary policy has played a larger role than fiscal policy in attempting to offset this 
slowdown, especially in Latin America. In some countries (China and Singapore), this was 
accompanied by fiscal deficits, so both policies were supportive. In other countries, however, monetary 
policy had to be tightened, for reasons discussed below.  
Improving the effectiveness of countercyclical policy 
As discussed above, and in more detail by Mohanty and Scatigna, emerging markets face special 
challenges in attempting to implement countercyclical fiscal policy. Automatic stabilisers are generally 
less effective, and financing constraints may limit the feasibility and effectiveness of stabilisation 
policy. What is the most appropriate fiscal policy response to these conditions?  
There is no simple answer to this question. For credit-constrained economies engaged in fiscal 
consolidation, a procyclical fiscal policy in the short run - in which the underlying fiscal position will not 
deteriorate during a downturn - may be the only feasible (or appropriate) policy response. This point is 
made by Sidaoui in his contribution to this volume. In some circumstances, procyclical fiscal policy 
during a downturn may ease financing constraints by increasing confidence in government policies. 
This appears to have been the experience of Brazil in 2003, when the overachievement of fiscal 
surplus targets and reassuring government initiatives were associated with sharp declines in Brazilian 
sovereign spreads.  
In most cases, emerging economies not facing financing constraints are able to adopt a medium-term 
structural fiscal target, allowing automatic stabilisers to work. For instance, Peru is attempting to 
design a system in which temporary deviations from fiscal targets are allowed during downturns, with 
provisions made for ensuring a return to target. (See Farfán’s contribution to this volume.) In Chile, the 
adoption of a structural surplus target has helped improve credibility and ease credit constraints for at 
least two reasons: (1) investors can tell more easily if deviations from the long-run fiscal stance during 
“bad times” are sustainable; and (2) a longer horizon makes authorities less susceptible to pressures 
to relax fiscal policy during “good times”. In addition, better access to credit can improve the operation 
of automatic stabilisers, thus enhancing the effectiveness of countercyclical policy.  
Fiscal and monetary policy 
The credibility of fiscal policy has a large influence on the conduct and effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Monetary policy is more effective when the private sector believes the government will not 
resort to inflationary deficit financing. This provides an additional tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. 
As long as inflation expectations are low, monetary policy can be used to offset a downturn during 
periods when fiscal policy cannot be expansionary. For several reasons, monetary policy may be the 
preferred tool for countercyclical policy, as it has a shorter implementation lag, a more predictable 
impact and is more easily reversed.  
A credible fiscal policy not only facilitates an activist countercyclical monetary policy, it might also be a 
prerequisite for monetary policy effectiveness. Otherwise the perception that fiscal policy will be 
dominant (ie monetary policy will eventually adjust to the financing requirements of the government) 
would have adverse economic consequences. The contributed papers and Mohanty and Scatigna cite 
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 a number of examples where such a conflict between fiscal and monetary policy is present. One 
example is provided by Israel, where the government’s failure to meet deficit targets resulted in an 
upward shift in the term structure of interest rates as inflation expectations rose, and in higher 
exchange rate volatility. The Bank of Israel was compelled to raise rates during a cyclical downturn to 
maintain the credibility of its inflation target.  
One factor which might lead to fiscal dominance is a high public debt burden. Some countries, such as 
Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s (see Vijayaledchumy’s contribution to this volume), have avoided 
such dominance by massively reducing the government’s role in the economy.  
Public debt and monetary policy 
Aside from being affected by the size of the public debt, monetary policy effectiveness is influenced by 
the maturity of public debt and its composition. The share of short-maturity debt in emerging markets 
has tended to decline. However, the remaining maturity of public debt is still relatively short, especially 
in Latin America. Furthermore, there are debts indexed to short-term interest rates, inflation and the 
exchange rate (equivalently, there is debt denominated in foreign currencies that is not hedged). For 
these reasons, many emerging economies are still vulnerable to the risk of interruptions in financing. 
This has played a role in recent crises in Argentina, Brazil and Turkey.  
The reliance on floating or short-maturity or exchange rate-linked debt may induce perverse monetary 
authority responses; see Goldstein and Turner (2003). To illustrate, a central bank would be reluctant 
to ease if the resulting currency depreciation would raise the burden of foreign currency debt. Hence, 
the indexation of public debt may also influence the channels of monetary policy transmission, 
sometimes in unexpected or perverse ways. Another example is that a currency depreciation is 
generally to be countered by higher domestic interest rates. However, if the public debt is indexed to 
short-term interest rates, the cost of the debt will rise, heightening uncertainty about sustainability and 
possibly accentuating the depreciation. As debt is often indexed to the exchange rate, currency 
depreciation will aggravate the public debt burden. Indexation of the public debt played a significant 
role in the recent difficulties experienced by Brazil and Turkey. 
3.  Central bank balance sheets and fiscal operations 
Central banks are not like ordinary financial institutions. On the one hand, their primary purpose is not 
to maximise profits, but to achieve macroeconomic and financial stability. On the other hand, central 
banks are in a position to generate unusually large profits. They have the sole right to issue domestic 
currency, and because they are able to raise (seigniorage) revenues they have an economic or 
franchise value that is not reflected in conventional measures of central bank capital.  
Governments often seek to capture central bank revenues in a number of ways that may impair the 
mandate of the central bank to control inflation. For example, the government may rely on central bank 
credit or seigniorage revenues to finance its deficits. As such deficit financing may involve increases in 
money creation and in inflation, it runs counter to the goals of the central bank. 
In recent years, as commitment to macroeconomic stability has strengthened, reliance on central bank 
financing of government deficits and on seigniorage has declined. As noted in the paper by Hawkins in 
this volume, central bank lending to governments is now generally prohibited or limited. Overdrafts are 
allowed with somewhat more frequency. Central bank purchases of government bonds in the primary 
market (which in some cases may reflect the direct monetisation of government debt) are allowed 
without restrictions in only three out of 14 emerging markets surveyed, while purchases in the 
secondary market are generally allowed. An example of institutional changes supporting greater 
central bank independence is Peru. Farfán’s paper provides details on the constitutional changes that 
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established central bank independence there, and describes legal restrictions on central bank 
financing to the public or private sector.
3 
In line with lower inflation, currency seigniorage as a percentage of GDP has fallen in a set of 
emerging markets from an average of 1.8% in the early 1980s to 0.5% in 1999-2001. Seigniorage from 
banks’ balances with the central bank is also small, ranging from lows of 0.1% of GDP to a high of 
1.5% of GDP. The modest revenues partly reflect the impact of financial liberalisation and lower 
reserve requirements. The paper by Hawkins spells out the different measures of seigniorage. 
The net income of the central bank will also depend on the principles governing the transfer of central 
bank earnings to the government. In a large number of cases, the amounts are set by law. In others, 
the government may decide (China or India). In the emerging markets surveyed, the central bank 
usually has no discretion on the allocation of profits (one exception is the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, which can decide after allocating minimum proportions to reserves and to the government). 
The amounts transferred range from 25% of profits in Peru to 100% in Israel.
4 In some cases, such as 
the Philippines, the government also taxes some of the financial transactions and the profits of the 
central bank. This raises the question of whether the government should obtain revenues through 
profit distributions from the central bank or by taxing the central bank. In his contribution to this 
volume, Tetangco argues against taxing the central bank. In the case of the Philippines the 
government is in effect taxing the central bank’s open market operations, reducing its ability to 
implement monetary policy.
5 
The government may also call on central banks to undertake a variety of quasi-fiscal operations 
(examples are given below) that expose central banks to potential losses that may deplete their 
capital. This raises the question of whether policymakers should care about low central bank capital or 
losses. The issue of low capital may not arise if the government is always willing to recapitalise the 
central bank. And even if it does not, low capital may not pose a problem for a central bank whose 
operations are profitable. However, a low level of capital may pose problems for a central bank that 
incurs losses and whose credibility is thereby impaired. Under these conditions, the ability of the 
central bank to meet its monetary objectives will depend on its ability to maintain an adequate amount 
of capital to deal with possible losses, or to avoid involvement in potentially costly quasi-fiscal 
activities, or both. 
In some countries, the desired capital of the central bank is made explicit and should ideally be related 
to the shocks that could affect the central bank balance sheet. In addition to policy lending, there are 
two main examples of quasi-fiscal activities that result in losses or deplete central bank capital: 
(1) central bank intervention in foreign currency markets; and (2) central bank involvement in restoring 
financial systems in the aftermath of crises. 
Central banks have incurred losses by hedging the currency exposure of domestic residents, or by 
engaging in sterilised intervention in foreign currency markets. As discussed by Marshall, one example 
of the latter case is Chile, which purchased foreign currency and sterilised the monetary effects by 
issuing interest bearing liabilities that paid a higher rate than the foreign assets it had acquired. The 
result was a persistent operating loss. There were no obvious adverse effects on the central bank’s 
ability to reduce inflation. One reason may be that the overall fiscal position of the consolidated 
government (including the central bank) appeared to be sustainable.  
Central banks have also been involved in rebuilding the financial sector in many emerging economies, 
including Chile, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Thailand and Turkey. In the first 
five cases, the central bank had to absorb some losses from these operations. In some other cases, 
such as Malaysia, the central bank books were better insulated. In what may be interpreted as forms 
of policy lending, The People’s Bank of China provides an undetermined amount of financing to asset 
management companies holding non-performing loans, while the central bank in Hungary has incurred 
losses from providing development credit financed by foreign borrowing.  
                                                       
3   While these results suggest that central banks face reduced pressures to finance government borrowing, they should be 
interpreted with care. If banks passively acquire government bonds, the central bank may still indirectly finance government 
deficits through the banking system. 
4   See the table on page 77 of this volume.  
5   For a general discussion of issues associated with the taxation of the financial sector, see the papers in Honohan (2003). 
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Central banks are often expected to rebuild their balance sheet out of their own resources in the 
aftermath of crises. This may take a long time, or create incentives to tax the financial system, for 
example by raising reserve requirements. A poorly capitalised central bank may therefore find itself 
adopting measures that discourage financial sector development. An alternative is for the government 
to step in to recapitalise the central bank. However, there may be substantial disincentives for fiscal 
authorities to do this. Central bank accounting of losses is often not transparent, and stepping in to 
recapitalise a central bank may involve making losses more visible and subjecting its management to 
political debate.  
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